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relation to its impact on organizational outcome in Indonesia using a dataset consisting of 190 
non-financial companies listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange in 2002. The study investigates the 
effect of family ownership, foreign blockholder, domestic institutional shareholders, and the 
board of directors on firm performance. The results confirm the different impact of different large 
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exacerbate agency problems while the presence of foreign investor is related to superior firm 
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CORPORATE CONTROL AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: DOES THE TYPE OF OWNERS 
MATTER? 
 
1. Introduction 
The structure of corporate ownership has been argued as being is the most important dimension 
of governance mechanism as it determines the distribution of control among contracting parties. 
The structure forms the nature of agency conflict specific to the firm and accordingly the very 
purpose of corporate governance portfolio adopted by the firm (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). In the 
dispersed firms, agency problem is related to the conflict between insider manager and outside 
shareholders. In contrast, the problem stems from utility maximizing behaviour of majority 
shareholders that diverges from those of minority shareholders whenever the corporate ownership 
is concentrated. 
 
Traditionally, the structure incorporates the level of shareholding and the type of large 
shareholders. The level of shareholding has been claimed as potentially helping to create the 
convergence of interest between those of agent and principal (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
However, higher shareholding provides majority owners with sufficient voting power to entrench 
themselves that leads to the expropriation of minority shareholders associated with the private 
benefit of control (La Porta et al. 1999; La Porta et al. 2000; Claessens et al. 2002). The type of 
large shareholders has been associated with different demand of governance configuration that 
potentially that results in different organizational outcome (Johnson & Greening 1999; Dahlquist 
& Robertsson 2001; Jiambalvo, Rajgopal & Venkatachalam 2002; Gillan & Starks 2003).  
Nevertheless, literature addressing this issue fails to document the individual impact of different 
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shareholders types on firm performance simultaneously. Accordingly, the effect of the multiple 
types of large shareholders on firm performance remains an open empirical question. 
 
The paper extends the blockholder study in relation to Indonesian context that has been proven as 
having a unique institutional setting. Particularly, the study investigates the effect of family 
ownership, foreign blockholder, domestic institutional shareholders, and the board of directors on 
the organizational outcome. The results confirm the different impact of different large 
shareholders on firm performance. Controlling family ownership is more likely to exacerbate 
agency problems while the presence of foreign investor is related to superior firm performance. 
Domestic blockholders is insignificantly related to firm performance. However, the contestability 
effect between family and domestic blockholders ownership is negatively related to firm 
performance, supporting empirical evidence to the existence of interlocking blockholders in 
Indonesia to deprive minority shareholders from their rights. 
 
The study contributes to governance literature in several ways. First, the study disentangles the 
different types of large shareholders in relation to the organizational outcome. This procedure is 
more likely to provide clearer tests on the individual impact of a particular blockholders on firm 
performance. Second, instead of using absolute level of shareholding, the study adopts 
contestability indicator that produce a better measure of corporate control. However, the study 
suffers from measurement and interdependence issues and thus, the results should be interpreted 
cautiously.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. The next section discusses the theoretical 
background and hypothesis development. The following section presents results method. The 
analysis and finding is presented in section 4. The last section discusses and summarizes the 
study.  
 
2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
Within agency theory, ownership structures determine the distribution of corporate control that 
lead to the nature of agency conflict specific to the firm (Barca & Becht 2001). In the dispersed 
firm, agency problems stem from the divergence of interest between those of managers and those 
of owners, where the free riding problem associated with diffused shareholders has been quoted 
as leading to a weak monitoring. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large shareholders might 
serve as a governance mechanism as a significant ownership provides the holders with the 
incentive and power to vote against management actions. Accordingly, it is asserted that 
blockholder facilitates disciplinary action and creates the condition necessary for effective 
corporate governance (Smith & Walter 2006). Empirical works claim that the presence of a 
blockholder may mitigate the agency problem as this type of owner has the incentive to monitor 
and the power to discipline management (Clyde 1997; Jones, Lee & Tompkins 1997; Jiambalvo, 
Rajgopal & Venkatachalam 2002). Moreover, Maug (1998) argues that monitoring by large 
shareholders is also associated with the capital gain associated with their private information 
from monitoring actions, where such benefit is theoretically supported since the trade-off 
between liquidity and control does not exist. 
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However, the identity of shareholders is an important dimension of ownership structure as higher 
ownership by different types of shareholders has been argued as producing a different impact on 
the association between control of the firms and organizational outcome. In the work of 
Jiambalvo, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2002), the term „large owner‟ refers to institutional 
shareholders, where their substantial ownership has been claimed as providing necessary 
incentive and economic rationale to collect information and monitor management. Eventually, 
such shareholders are expected to have a positive association with value-enhancing activities. For 
example, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) argue that firms under investigation for 
manipulation of earnings have less outside blockholders, suggesting that better informed 
blockholders reduce the perceived benefit of managing accruals. Ultimately, a significant 
shareholding enables the institutional shareholder to oust poorly performing management, thus 
providing managers with incentive to perform better. In other works, the term „large shareholder‟ 
refers to the family ownership that is prevalent in Asia, European, and Latin America (Lins 
2002). Khan (1999) posits that family-based control, especially in Asia, has been accepted as an 
indisputable fact. Pevious works have documented that ownership concentration negatively 
affects firm performance in East Asia (Claessens et al. 2002) and in developed countries 
(Gadhoum 2000; Ehrhardt & Nowak 2003) whenever such concentration is held by family. 
Morck and Yeung (2003) suggest that control by family serves as a device in pursuing the family 
interest that is not shared with the other shareholders. The private benefit of control associated 
with ownership concentration facilitates the family to divert firm resources in order to maximize 
their wealth and thereby deprives minority shareholders from their rights. 
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The role of the large shareholder as a governance mechanism also depends on the level of 
corporate governance of their country of origin where the firm is incorporated. Doidge (2004) 
argues that developed countries like the US provide strong investor protection through various 
regulations and market mechanisms which, in turn, force firms to adopt sound corporate 
governance practices. This protection facilitates continuous scrutiny by shareholders (Doidge, 
Karolyi & Stulz 2004) and, consequently, investing firms face performance pressure that ensures 
they monitor their foreign investment (Boardman, Shapiro & Vining 1997). Accordingly, it is 
beneficial for the host economy to sell a fraction of a company to a foreign firm that has already 
operated in that country with good governance practice (La Porta et al., 2000). This investment 
pattern is believed to bring about improvement in corporate governance of host firms, since 
investing firms will demand such improvement to secure their investment.  
 
The previous discussion reveals that the types of large shareholders might produce different 
impacts on organizational outcome. Therefore, it is predicted that the association between family 
ownership, foreign and domestic large shareholders and firm performance will exhibit different 
pattern. The formal hypothesis is as follows 
 
H1: The association between family ownership, foreign and domestic large shareholders and 
firm performance will exhibit different direction and magnitude. 
 
 
3. Research Method 
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The  sample is based on all industrial firms that were listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) as at 
31 December 2002, excluding banking and financial services firms as these industries have been 
documented as having specific governance characteristics (Campbell & Keys, 2002) and 
accounting standard (Lemmon and Lins, 2001). The sample also excludes the firms that were not 
presented in all data sources. Performance indicators are obtained from Indonesian Capital 
Market Directory (ICMD) manual database. The data of controlling owners is compiled from 
Annual Report that discloses the immediate owners and Profile of Publicly Listed Company 
(PPLC) and Prominent (PRO) for the ultimate owners. The data of foreign shareholder and 
unrelated domestic blockholders are gathered from Annual Report. 
 
The following model is developed to analyse the relationship between board structure and firm 
performance. The model includes the proportion of independent director serving on the board and 
on audit committee as the proxies of board monitoring, assets as the proxy of firm size, and 
industry as control variables.  
ROA it      =  α + ß1 FMLYit +ß2 FRGNit+ß3 DOMTit+ ß4 OUTDit 
   + ß5 AUDCit +ß6 INDYit +ß7 ASSTit+ εit 
 
where: 
FMLYit : controlling family ownership of firm i at year t  
FRGNit: foreign ownership of firm i at year t  
FMLYit : domestic unrelated large shareholders ownership of firm i at year t  
OUTDit: the fraction of independent directors of firm i at year t  
AUDCit: the fraction of independent directors serving in audit committee of firm i at year t 
ASSTit:  firms size of firm i at year t  
AGEit:  firms‟ age of firm i at year t of firm i at year t  
INDYit: industry group of firm i at year t  
 
Firm performance is measured using Return on Assets 2002 as Khana and Palepu (1999) argue 
that using market-based indicator is inappropriate in emerging countries where illiquid and thin 
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trading market dictate the absence of efficient form of capital market. Return on asset is defined 
as the ratio of earning before interest, extraordinary item, and taxes to total asset as of 2002. The 
study use family as the unit of analysis and therefore we aggregate the individual shareholding of 
family members of controlling owners to construct controlling family ownership. Capital Market 
Law 1995 (article 1) states that family affiliation refers to the relationship by marriage and blood 
both to second degree vertically and horizontally. Controlling shareholders ownership is defined 
by simply accumulating the cash-flow right of their immediate ownership proportional to total 
number of common shares. A 20% cut-off is used in differentiating between family-controlled 
and non-family-controlled firm
1
. Foreign shareholders and domestic blockholder are defined as 
institutional shareholders that are independent of controlling family, with at least 5% 
shareholding of the firm. Foreign and domestic blockholder ownership is defined as the 
proportion of their shareholding to total number of outstanding shares. The fraction of 
independent directors is defined as the ratio of independent directors to total numbers of 
directors.  
 
4. Results 
4. a. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and the correlation of variables of interest. Overall, the 
correlation coefficients between independent variables are relatively low indicating that there is 
no presence of multicollinearity problem, except for controlling family ownership (FMLY) and 
foreign shareholding (FRGN). It is not surprising given that family ownership, foreign 
                                               
1 See for example LaPorta, Lopes-de-Silanes, and Sheifler (1998) and  Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000). 
However, it should be noted that this cut-off point is best viewed as “researcher discretionary” as, to date, there is no 
theoretical work justifying this point.  
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shareholding, and domestic blockholding are mutually exclusive in nature.  The average 
shareholding by controlling family is 57% ranging from 0% (minimum) to 98% (maximum)
2
. 
Further analysis reveals that controlling owners hold more than 50% of corporate shares in 103 
firms (70% of the sample). Controlling owners are absent in only 21 firms, representing 12% of 
total sample. This description confirms the work of Lukviarman (2004) documenting the 
ownership concentration by controlling family in 70% Indonesian listed firms during 1994 to 
2000. The presence of controlling shareholders is evidence in 88% of the sample (167 firms). 
Diffused ownership, where minority investor cumulatively own more than 80% of corporate 
shares, is found in only 5 firms representing 3% of total sample that supports that of Claessens, 
Djankov, Lang (2000) revealing the prevalence of concentrated ownership firms and that only 
small numbers of Indonesian firms have dispersed ownership structure.  
Insert table 1 about here ->>> 
The average foreign investor‟s shareholding is 11 % with 0% as the minimum and 96% as the 
maximum. However, only one third of firms exhibit the presence of foreign shareholders where 
such shareholders are absent in most listed firms (135 firms representing 71% of the sample). 
Foreign investors own 50% or higher of the corporate shareholding in 20 firms representing 11% 
of the sample. Further analysis reveals that 5% of the listed firms are jointly owned by foreign 
and domestic investor with 50% cumulative shareholding or higher. ADB (2001) contends that 
such a coalition provides foreign investor with access to local market and political connection. 
Domestic blockholders are found in only 11% of the sample (22 firms) with an average 
                                               
2 In all sample, the immediate owner of a firm is another company of particular business groups owned by the same 
controlling owners. This ownership structure, so-called pyramidal ownership, is consistent with the finding of 
Claessens et al (2000, 2001). In some occasion, the firm is jointly owned by several families who form the 
partnership to control the firms. However, this joint ownership is a floating coalition, instead of permanent coalition, 
where the partnership changes in other firms.  
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shareholding of 2.5% ranges from 0% (minimum) to 49% (maximum). Of these firms, the 
highest frequency falls into 5% to 20% ownership category. Eighty-eight percent of the sample 
(168 firms) displays the absence of domestic blockholder suggesting that the absence of external 
large shareholders, who are independent of controlling shareholders, is a norm in Indonesian 
listed firms. 
 
Controlling family ownership exhibits a negative correlation with firm performance (ROA2), 
suggesting that higher family ownership is associated with lower firm performance. Foreign 
ownership is positively correlated with firm performances, indicating that foreign-controlled firm 
is more likely to have superior performance as compared to family-controlled firm. The 
correlation coefficient between the proportion of independent directors and firm performance is 
insignificant. Taken together, the findings indicate that different owners have different 
association with firm performance. In other words, the identity of large shareholders does matter 
in predicting organizational outcome.  
 
The proportion of independent directors (IDPD) is positively correlated with domestic 
blockholder (DOM), suggesting that higher shareholding by domestic independent large 
shareholders is associated with a higher fraction of independent directors. By contrast, family 
ownership and foreign shareholders are insignificantly associated with the fraction of 
independent directors. Again, the findings reveal that different owners pursue different choices of 
governance mechanisms. The proportion of independent directors is positively correlated with the 
proportion of independent directors serving on audit committee (AUDC), indicating that an 
outsider dominated board tends to have a higher proportion of independent directors serving in 
  
 
 12 
audit committee. However, the proportion of independent directors and audit committee are 
insignificantly correlated with firm performance is insignificant indicating that monitoring by 
independent board is less likely to mitigate agency problem in Indonesia.  
 
4. b. Multivariate Data Analysis  
Table 2 reports the results from OLS regressions linking Controlling family ownership, Foreign 
ownership, domestic blockholder, the representation of independent directors, audit committee, 
control variables and firm performance. The F-value for all specification is significant at the 1% 
level and the R
2
 is ranging between 0.107 and 0.133 except for equation 3. Specification 1 reveals 
that corporate ownership by controlling family is related to firm performance at 1% significance 
level. The negative sign suggests that higher family ownership is associated with lower firm 
performance. The finding indicates that higher ownership by controlling family is more likely to 
create entrenchment effect, rather than alignment effect, that is detrimental to firm performance, 
and confirms the work of Gadhoum (2000) and Ehrhardt and  Nowak (2003). Surprisingly, while 
the proportion of independent directors is insignificantly related to organizational outcome, audit 
committee is found to have negative relationship with firm performance. The findings indicate a 
higher likelihood of either the board being endogenously determined institution (Hermalin & 
Weisbach 1998; Hermalin & Weisbach 2003) or de facto convergence issue in the appointment 
of independent directors (Palepu, Khanna & Kogan 2002) or both. Firm size is related to firm 
performance at a marginal significance level. The positive sign suggests that the size of the firm 
is more likely to reflects agency problem associated with the legal and financial access constraint 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic 1998; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic 2005), rather than 
investment opportunity sets (Ho, Lam & Sami 2004; Hutchinson & Gull 2004).  
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Insert table 2 about here ->>> 
Specification 2 shows that foreign ownership is related to firm performance at 1% confidence 
level. In contrast to specification 1, the positive sign suggests that foreign-controlled firm is more 
likely to have superior firm performance as compared to family-controlled firms. The finding 
provides empirical evidence that the identity of owners matters in predicting firm performance. 
Firm size remains positively related to firm performance while the insignificant relationship 
between independent directors and firm performance persists. The audit committee become 
insignificant predictor of firm performance. Specification 3 tells completely different story. In the 
absence of family ownership and foreign shareholding, the model becomes insignificantly 
different from zero as the F-value decreases to 1.462. Nevertheless, the findings of table 3 reveal 
the different effects of different type of owners on firm performance. 
 
Although large shareholding might serve as governance mechanism, certain ownership structure 
may limit the effectiveness of corporate control, as it determines the power of contracting parties 
within an organization  (Lannoo 1999). According to La Porta et al. (La Porta et al. 1999; La 
Porta et al. 2000), a particular level of stockholding provides the large shareholder with almost 
complete control over the firm‟s decisions. Eventually, such structure of corporate shareholdings 
influences the incentive of the large shareholder to commit expropriation from the firm. 
Unfortunately, most firms around the world generally have controlling owners, which is 
entrenched and sufficiently powerful to design the contract (La Porta et al. 1999; La Porta et al. 
2000). Having control of a firm, an owner can divert a fraction of profit, and not all of the profit 
is distributed to other shareholders, on a pro rata basis. Accordingly, the common agency 
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problems in most economies are related to the conflict between controlling owners and minority 
shareholders. 
 
Theoretically, the disadvantage of single controlling ownership could be mitigated by certain 
ownership patterns. Maury and Pajuste (2005) argue that the most important dimension of control 
associated with large shareholders rests in its contestability, which requires the presence of 
multiple large shareholders. A higher contestability associated with the existence of multiple 
blockholders increases the marginal cost of stealing, which lessens the incentive of expropriation 
and, accordingly, enhances firm performance. Therefore, contestability potentially improves the 
alignment of interests of those contracting parties, implying that the benefit of a check and 
balance system would be achieved whenever control of the firm is optimally distributed among 
contracting parties
3
. This perspective underlines the importance of unrelated blockholders, who 
have incentives to collect information and monitor management, and sufficient voting power to 
over-ride or oust management, as a governance mechanism. In other words, the importance of 
multiple large shareholders hinges upon the level of control contestability, where the higher 
contestability has been claimed as being positively associated with firm performance. Thus, a 
partial contestability might serve as a good proxy of different impact of corporate control. To test 
this proposition, the study reruns OLS regression using the contestability as the measure of 
ownership structure. The result is presented in Table 3. The F-value for all specifications is 
relatively high and the R2 is ranging between 0.114 and 0.125. 
                                               
3 Based on the control distribution, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (1999) differentiate between dictatorship-firm and 
democracy-firm. However, this classification is based on the shareholder right to contest management decisions 
provided by company by law and charter. The former refers to the firm where management has an effective control 
and the latter refer to the case where shareholders might effectively challenge management proposals. 
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Insert table 3 about here ->>> 
Specification 1 shows the contestability between family and foreign ownership is positively 
related to firm performance 5% significance level, suggesting that a higher firm performance 
would be observed in the firm where family control is challengeable. The contestability between 
family and domestic blockholder ownership is related to firm performance 1% significance level. 
The negative sign suggests that the presence of contestability between controlling family and 
unrelated domestic blockholder is more likely to lower firm performance. Firm size, as 
represented by assets, is positively related to firm performance marginally. 
 
Specification 2 reveals that contestability between foreign and domestic blockholder is found to 
have a relationship with firm performance. The positive sign indicates that better firm 
performance would be observed with the higher contestability between those types of 
shareholders. Surprisingly, the contestability between family and foreign ownership becomes 
insignificant. Firm size remains a marginal predictor of firm performance. Specification 3 
presents the persistence of contestability between foreign and domestic blockholder at 1% 
significance level positively. As compared to specification 1, the significance relationship 
between controlling family-domestic blockholder contestability with firm performance 
disappears. Nevertheless, the results of specifications 1 to 3 reveal that the contestability becomes 
beneficial with the presence of foreign investor and thus the notion that the different types of 
owners are more likely to have different impact on firm performance.  
 
5. Conclusions, Discussions, and Limitations 
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The study finds that most Indonesian listed firms have majority owners with 20% shareholding or 
higher, suggesting the prevalence of ownership concentration in the hands of controlling 
shareholders. Consistent with this finding, the work of Claessens et al., (2000) documents the 
prevalence of ownership concentration by the controlling family in their dataset of East Asian 
firms. According to Gul and Tsui (2004), a dispersed ownership is an exception in Asian 
economies, although the level of ownership concentration varies across firms and countries. 
Literature suggests that large shareholding might serve as a governance mechanism that benefits 
the firms. Higher shareholding by insider has been quoted as enhancing the convergence of 
interests of principals and agents (Jensen & Meckling 1976) while higher ownership by outside 
shareholder will provide the holders with the incentive to better monitor management (Shleifer & 
Vishny 1986). Eventually, the continuous scrutiny by large shareholders will encourage firm 
performance and this benefit of large shareholders will be enjoyed by other corporate 
shareholders. Therefore, the shared-benefit of control associated with large shareholding might 
benefit the firms and minority shareholders.  
 
However, the type of large shareholders might have a significant impact on either the incentive to 
monitor management or to deprive minority shareholders from their rights. The study reveals that 
ownership concentration by family is negatively related to firm performance, and thus indicates 
that the private benefit of control associated with ownership concentration facilitates the family to 
divert firm resources. Accordingly, the finding supports the view that ownership concentration by 
family is more likely to be related to the expropriation hypothesis that is detrimental to firm 
performance. Domestic blockholder is insignificantly related to firm performance while foreign 
investor is found to have a positive relationship with firm performance. The findings suggest that 
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foreign shareholding is more likely to have superior performance as compared to the higher 
ownership by domestic large shareholders. Accordingly, the findings provide empirical support 
to the notion claiming the existence of different impact of different large shareholders type. 
 
The contestability between family and foreign ownership is positively related to firm 
performance suggesting that control contest is work well with the presence of family and foreign 
shareholdings. The presence of foreign and domestic large shareholding is found to help 
mitigating agency problem as the contestability between those types of shareholders is positive. 
However, the contestability between family and domestic blockholders is negative indicating that 
the existence of interlocking corporate control between those types of large shareholders, where 
the benefits are privately enjoyed and are not shared with other contracting parties. The findings 
suggests that, in the case of Indonesia, foreign investors are more likely to challenge the family 
and domestic blockholder control whenever they have sufficient voting power associated with 
their significant shareholding. In other words, the voice strategy seems work well whenever 
corporate control is contested by foreign. The results thus confirm that different types of large 
shareholders produce different organizational outcome.  
 
Several caveats are in order. First, the study uses accounting numbers to define performance 
indicator that has been claimed as suffering from earning restatement. Fan and Wong (2002) and 
Bhattacharya et al. (2002) find that Indonesian listed firms generously inflate their earning 
statement that is partly attributable to the ownership structure. Although it is not necessarily 
illegal, earning restatement might benefit one contracting parties at the expense of others. The 
absence of a proper procedure to control for this problem might create a bias in investigating the 
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association between governance mechanisms and firm performance. Second, the study measures 
family ownership by aggregating their immediate shareholding that leads to the absence of 
separation between voting rights and cash flow rights. This procedure overlooks the competing 
impact of entrenchment effect and the alignment incentive effect. Zhang (2003) argues that the 
expropriation is more pervasive in firms with the divergence between voting rights and cash flow 
rights and firms that are an integral part of business groups. Accordingly, aggregating their 
immediate shareholding might understate the incentive of controlling owners in committing 
expropriation as Indonesian listed firms exhibit higher wedge between cash flow and voting right 
(Claessens et al., 2002). Third, the issue of concern may also come from the procedure that treats 
identically the level of investor protection provided by the country of origin of foreign investor. 
The importance of foreign investors as governance mechanism hinges upon the presumption that 
their countries of origin, particularly developed economies like the US, provide investor with a 
strong protection through various regulations and market mechanisms (Stulz, 1999, Coffee, 1999, 
Mitton, 2004). The greater scrutiny and monitoring by the market eventually will force the firms 
to ensure that they monitor their foreign investments (Boardman et al., 1997). Leuz et al. (2005) 
suggest that the level of investor protection differs across countries implying that the pressure of 
effective monitoring will vary across foreign investors. However, this study leaves such an issue 
unaddressed that might lead to the failure to reflecting the true performance effect of the 
differences of monitoring activities by such investors. Therefore, the finding of this study should 
be interpreted cautiously. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
This table presents pairwise correlations of variables. FMLY is the proportion of common share held by controlling family to total 
number of outstanding common share. FRGN is the proportion of common share held by foreign investor to total number of 
outstanding common share. DOMT is the proportion of common share held by domestic large shareholders to total number of 
outstanding common share. IDPD is the proportion of independent directors to total number of directors. AUDC is the proportion 
of independent directors serving on audit committee to total number of director serving on the committee. ASST is the natural log 
of total assets. INDTRY is a 3-digit code based on JSX industry classification. ROA02 is the ratio of earnings before interest, 
taxes and extraordinary items to book value of assets as of 31 December 2002. a, b, and c represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively.     
 FMLY 
 
FRGN 
 
DOMT 
 
IDPD 
 
AUD INDY  ASST 
 
ROA2 
min 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
1.000 1.000  10.459 
 
-0.210 
max 0.980 
 
0.970 
 
0.490 
 
0.750 
 
3.000 35.000  17.714 
 
0.425 
mean 0.575 
 
0.114 
 
0.020 
 
0.377 
 
2.651 17.090  13.598 
 
0.058 
std 0.253 
 
0.241 
 
0.069 
 
0.110 
 
0.725 10.314  1.345 
 
0.097 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
FMLY 1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
FRGN -0.751 
a 
1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
DOMT -0.100 
 
-0.027 
 
1.000 
 
 
 
    
 
 
IDPD -0.119 
 
0.010 
 
0.128 
c 
1.000 
 
    
 
 
AUDC -0.115 
 
-0.014 
 
0.025 
 
0.180 
b 
1.000    
 
 
INDY 0.093 
 
-0.125 
c 
-0.003 
 
0.005 
 
-0.060 1.000   
 
 
ASST -0.084 
 
0.026 
 
-0.031 
 
0.027 
 
0.154 -0.012  1.000 
 
 
ROA2 -0.261 
a 
0.321 
a 
0.020 
 
-0.065 
 
-0.086 -0.078  0.129 
c 
1.000 
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Table 2: Cross-sectional OLS Regression of ROA on Board Compositions and Controlling 
Family Shareholding (N=190) 
This table presents cross-sectional OLS regression of ROA on ownership by different type of shareholders, board compositions, 
and control variables. The dependent variable is ROA 2002, defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to book 
value of assets as of 31 December 2002. FMLY is the proportion of common share held by controlling family to total number of 
outstanding common share. FRGN is the proportion of common share held by foreign investor to total number of outstanding 
common share. DOMT is the proportion of common share held by domestic large shareholders to total number of outstanding 
common share. IDPD is the proportion of independent directors to total number of directors. AUDC is the proportion of 
independent directors serving on audit committee to total number of director serving on the committee. ASST is the natural log of 
total assets. INDY is a 3-digit code based on JSX industry classification. a, b, and c represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively.     
  1 
 
2 
 
3  
(Constant) beta 0.072 
 
-0.031 
 
-0.018  
 t-value 0.929 
 
-0.429 
 
-0.240  
FMLY beta -0.103 
a 
 
 
  
 t-value -3.767 
 
 
 
  
FRGN beta  
 
0.125 
a 
  
 t-value  
 
4.483 
 
  
DOMT beta  
 
 
 
0.048  
 t-value  
 
 
 
0.466  
IDPD beta -0.068 
 
-0.048 
 
-0.047  
 t-value -1.077 
 
-0.770 
 
-0.723  
AUDC beta -0.017 
c 
-0.013 
 
-0.014  
 t-value -1.740 
 
-1.343 
 
-1.397  
ASST beta 0.009 
c 
0.010 
c 
0.011  
 t-value 1.792 
 
1.954 
 
1.995  
INDY beta -0.001 
 
0.000 
 
-0.001  
 t-value -0.837 
 
-0.621 
 
-1.134  
   
 
 
 
  
R2  0.107 
 
0.133 
 
0.038  
Adj-R2  0.082 
 
0.109 
 
0.012  
F  4.365 
 
5.591 
 
1.462  
Sig.  0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.204  
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Table 3: Cross-sectional OLS Regression of ROA on Board Compositions and Controlling 
Family Shareholding (N=190) 
This table presents cross-sectional OLS regression of ROA on ownership by different type of shareholders, board compositions, 
and control variables. The dependent variable is ROA 2002, defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to book 
value of assets as of 31 December 2002. FMLFRG is the contestability between family ownership and foreign shareholding 
defined as the square of first different between those variables. FAMDOM is the contestability between family ownership and 
domestic blockholding defined as the square of first different between those variables. FRGDOM is the contestability between 
foreign shareholding and domestic blockholding defined as the square of first different between those variables. IDPD is the 
proportion of independent directors to total number of directors. AUDC is the proportion of independent directors serving on audit 
committee to total number of director serving on the committee. ASST is the natural log of total assets. INDY is a 3-digit code 
based on JSX industry classification. a, b, and c represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.     
  1 
 
2 
 
3  
(Constant) beta 0.004 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.006 
 
 t-value 0.048 
 
-0.139 
 
-0.082 
 
FMLFRG beta 0.100 
b 
-0.022 
 
 
 
 t-value 2.585 
 
-0.762 
 
 
 
FAMDOM beta -0.146 
a 
 
 
-0.029 
 
 t-value -3.961 
 
 
 
-0.893 
 
FRGDOM beta  
 
0.156 
a 
0.130 
a 
 t-value  
 
4.242 
 
3.017 
 
IDPD beta -0.063 
 
-0.056 
 
-0.058 
 
 t-value -0.996 
 
-0.901 
 
-0.931 
 
AUD beta -0.013 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.013 
 
 t-value -1.374 
 
-1.333 
 
-1.349 
 
ASST beta 0.010 
c 
0.010 
c 
0.010 
c 
 t-value 1.936 
 
1.892 
 
1.896 
 
INDY beta 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 t-value -0.753 
 
-0.752 
 
-0.738 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
R2  0.114 
 
0.124 
 
0.125 
 
Adj-R2  0.084 
 
0.095 
 
0.096 
 
F  3.891 
 
4.289 
 
4.330 
 
Sig.  0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 
